---

As a general rule compromises of every description are to be regarded with distrust. Taken at the best they are of the nature of sacrifices, as each party is supposed to give up something which he considers of more or less importance. And this is not all. A plan or policy which is the result of a compromise is not a single plan or policy, but a mixture of plans, a mixture of policies. Now the several parts, instead of aiding and sustaining each other, will be very likely to interfere with and obstruct each other. Accordingly, if a compromise is called for, the first question we should ask ourselves is, whether the occasion for making it may not be avoided altogether. Many of our associations are entirely voluntary. But all our associations are not voluntary in the sense here intended. The family, for example, is not a voluntary, but a necessary association; and so likewise, in a certain sense and to a certain extent, is the neighbourhood, the Church, the State. Every man must live in society. I do not say in this or that society, but in some society. Concessions, then, we must make; but what concessions? How far can we carry the spirit of compromise without trenching at the same time on the laws of Christian truth and righteousness? To this question I reply, first, by observing that we are in no danger of trenching on the laws of Christian truth and righteousness so long as our compromises do not involve anything more than the giving up of our own tastes, our own convenience, our own innocent pleasures, our own interests, even our own rights, out of regard to others, and in the spirit of Christian concession and self sacrifice. To say that we have a right to give up our rights may sound to some like contradiction; but it is a contradiction in sound, in appearance, only. Indeed, not to give up our rights is to give up nothing; for why talk about giving up what we have no right to retain if we would? At the same time it is proper to add that our right to give up our rights depends on their being ours exclusively. We have no right to give up our neighbours' rights without their consent, express or implied. A parent, for example, might be willing to give up one or more of his own rights if he were sure the loss would fall on him alone; but if, on the contrary, he knows that, directly or indirectly, it will fall on the whole family, he will feel that they also have a voice in the matter. Again, a right may be held in common, and require to be maintained in common, and all therefore may be in some sense pledged to its defence in common, as in the case of civil or religious liberty. Here, as before, no individual can honestly act as if he alone were interested in the event. And this brings me to what may be called the pinch of the question. Have we a right, under any circumstances whatever, to go contrary to our duty for the sake of peace, or to meet those we must act with half-way, or on the plea that in a choice of evils we should take the least, or in the hope that in the end virtue and humanity will be gainers by such a course? Thus stated, it seems to me that the question answers itself. We have no such right. But we must not think that the annunciation of a moral truism like this will go far to clear up the great practical difficulty we are considering. The question disappears in one form, it is true, but only to come up in another. In a sharp collision of opinions and interests, of rights and duties, of reciprocal benefits and mutual obligations, may not my duty itself become changed? Let me suppose a case. A community, bound together by a multitude of reciprocal affections, interests, and obligations, fall into irreconcilable difference respecting a single question, and that a moral one. What are they to do? Some may think to cut the matter short by insisting that the party which is right ought not to give up, ought not to make the smallest concessions. And this is true, supposing it to be known and conceded which party is right; but unhappily this is the very point in dispute. The question is not what the party shall do is right, but what the party shall do which thinks itself right. And if you still answer, "Not concede one jot nor tittle," then you have no ground of complaint against your opponents for not conceding one jot nor tittle to you, for they also think themselves right. If, therefore, we persist in shutting our eyes on these obvious facts, that is to say, pay no regard to the judgment and the consciences of others, but proceed to act on our own as if we were infallible, when we know we are not, the mistake, if we fall into one, does not make wrong to be right even for us; nay, is no excuse for the wrong. It is not mistake, properly so called, but obstinacy; and obstinacy is no excuse for delinquency of any kind. Another ground sometimes taken is, that where two parties are at variance, only one can be right; and consequently that a compromise supposes a departure from the right course on one side or the other. This, however, does not follow. I admit that where two parties are at variance, both cannot be right; but it does not follow that either is so, that is, wholly right. Both parties cannot be right, but both parties may be wrong; at least more or less so. And if so, it would seem that each party has something of wrong to give up, and the compromise that should consist of mutual concessions of this sort would evidently result, not in a departure from right on either side, but in an approximation to right on both sides. I have spoken of compromises in general, not of any particular compromise. I am aware that there is often less difficulty in laying down general principles than in applying them with the limitations and qualifications which the circumstances of the case require. Still something is gained by clearly apprehending the principles — the applications must be left to the occasion as it arises; and let me add, that a right application of the principles in. the most perplexing circumstances will mainly depend, not on a morbid sensitiveness to the question at issue, nor yet on casuistical subtlety, but on downright honesty of purpose, a sound understanding, and a truly generous and magnanimous spirit.

(J. Walker, D. D.)

---

---

KJV: And unto the Jews I became as a Jew, that I might gain the Jews; to them that are under the law, as under the law, that I might gain them that are under the law;

WEB: To the Jews I became as a Jew, that I might gain Jews; to those who are under the law, as under the law, that I might gain those who are under the law;