Romans 2:1.—ch. Romans 3:20. Having shown, ch. Romans 1:18-32, in the case of the Gentiles, that they were strangers to the δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ, Paul now, ch. 2–3:20, exhibits the same fact with reference to the Jews, and thus adduces the second half of the proof as to the universal necessity of justification by faith. Naturally the Apostle was chiefly concerned with this second half of the proof, as the ἀδικία of heathenism was in itself clear; but we see from ch. 2 that the detailed character of that delineation of Gentile wickedness was intended at the same time as a mirror for degenerate Judaism, to repress all Jewish conceit. Comp Mangold, p. 102.

Romans 2:1. Διό] refers back to the main tenor of the whole previous exposition (Romans 2:18-29), and that indeed in its more special aspect as setting forth the moral condition of heathenism in respect to its inexcusableness. This reference is confirmed by the fact, that ἀναπολόγητος εἶ is said with a manifest glancing back to Romans 1:20; it is laid down by Paul as it were as a finger-post for his διό. The reference assumed by Reiche, Fritzsche, Krehl, de Wette, and older writers, to the proposition in Romans 1:32, that the rightful demand of God adjudges death to the evil-doers; or to the cognizance of that verdict, in spite of which the Gentiles were so immoral (Philippi, Baur, Th. Schott, Hofmann, Mangold), has against it the fact that this thought formed only a subsidiary sentence in what went before; whereas here a new section begins, at the head of which Paul very naturally has placed a reference, even expressly marked by ἀναπολόγητος, to the entire section ending with Romans 1:32, over which he now throws once more a retrospective glance. The connection of ideas therefore is: “wherefore,” i.e. on account of that abomination of vice pointed out in Romans 2:18-29, “thou art inexcusable,” etc.; “for”—to exhibit now more exactly this “wherefore”—wherein thou judgest the other, thou condemnest thyself, because thou doest the same thing. In other words: before the mirror of this Gentile life of sin all excuse vanishes from thee, O man who judgest, for this mirror reflects thine own conduct, which thou thyself therefore condemnest by thy judgment. A deeply tragic de te narratur! into which the proud Jewish consciousness sees itself all of a sudden transferred. A proleptic use of διό (Tholuck) is not to be thought of; not even γάρ is so used in the N. T. (see on John 4:44), and διό neither in the N. T. nor elsewhere.

ὦ ἄνθρωπε πᾶς ὁ κρίνων] Just as Paul, Romans 1:18, designated the Gentiles by the general term ἀνθρώπων, and only brought forward the special reference to them in the progress of the discourse; so also he now designates the Jews, not as yet by name (see this first at Romans 2:17), but generally by the address ἄνθρωπε, which however already implies a trace of reproach (Romans 9:20; Luke 12:14; Plat. Prot. p. 330 D, Gorg. p. 452 B, and the passages in Wetstein, Ellendt, Lex. Soph. I. p. 164), while at the same time he makes it by his πᾶς ὁ κρίνων sufficiently apparent that he is no longer speaking of the class already delineated, but is turning now to the Jews contrasted with them; for the self-righteous judging respecting the Gentiles as rejected of God (Midr. Tillin f. 6, 3; Chetubb. f. 3, 2; and many other passages) was in fact a characteristic of the Jews. Hence all the more groundless is the hasty judgment, that this passage has nothing whatever to do with the contrast between Jews and Gentiles (Hofmann). Comp Romans 2:17 ff. And that it is the condemning κρίνειν which is meant, and not the moral capacity of judgment in general (Th. Schott) and its exercise (Hofmann) (comp on Matthew 7:9), follows from the subsequent κατακρίνεις more precisely defining its import. Consequently the quite general interpretation (Beza, Calovius, Benecke, Mehring, Luthardt, vom freien Willen, p. 416) seems untenable, as well as the reference to the Gentiles as the judging subjects (Th. Schott), or to all to whom Romans 1:32 applied (Hofmann), or even specially to Gentile authorities (Chrysostom, Theodoret, Theophylact, Oecumenius, Cajetanus, Grotius).

Regarding the nominative as further ethical epexegesis of the vocative, see Bernhardy, p. 67, Buttmann, Neut. Gr. p. 123.

ἐν ᾧ] either instrumental: thereby, that, equivalent to ἐν τούτῳ ὅτι (Hofmann); or, still more closely corresponding to the τὰ γὰρ αὐτὰ πράσσεις: in which thing, in which point. Comp Romans 14:22. The temporal rendering: eodem tempore quo (Köllner, Reithmayr), arbitrarily obscures the moral identity, which Paul intended to bring out. The κατακρίνεις however is not facto condemnas. (Estius, van Hengel), but the judgment pronounced upon the other is a condemnatory judgment upon thyself, namely, because it applies to thine own conduct. On the contrast between ἕτερον and σεαυτόν comp Romans 2:21; 1 Corinthians 10:24; 1 Corinthians 10:29; Galatians 6:4; Php 2:4.

τὰ αὐτά] the same sins and vices, not indeed according to all their several concrete manifestations, as previously described, but according to their essential moral categories; see Romans 2:17-24. Comp on the idea John 8:7.

ὁ κρίνων] with reproachful emphasis.Romans 2:1-16. The Apostle has now to prove that the righteousness of God is as necessary to the Jew as to the pagan; it is the Jew who is really addressed in this chapter from the beginning, though he is not named till Romans 2:9. In Romans 2:1-10 Paul explains the principle on which God judges all men, without distinction.Ch. Romans 2:1-16. Human sin, continued: Jews and Gentiles equal in guilt and peril: gradual approach to the Jewish question

1. Therefore] It is difficult to state the precise bearing of this word; the exact premiss to which it refers. It is, perhaps, best explained by a brief statement of the apparent general connexion here.

St Paul has described the great fact of Human Sin. He has done so in terms which point specially to heathendom, but not exclusively. Two points, the universality of sin, and the universality of conscience (v. 18, 32), are plainly meant to be true of all men, idolaters or not. But now, in our present verse, he has it in view to expose specially the state of Jewish sinners; but to do this by leading gradually up to the convincing point, which is not reached till Romans 2:16. Really, but not explicitly, therefore, he here addresses the Jew, as included in the previous condemnation, but as thinking himself all the while the “judge” of heathen sinners. In words, he addresses any self-constituted “judge;” while in fact he specially, though still not exclusively, addresses the Jew. And he addresses him as “inexcusable,” because of his sin, and because of his conscience, a conscience in his case peculiarly enlightened.

The “therefore” thus points mainly to the words just previous; to the fact of a knowledge of God’s penal statute against sin, while yet sin is committed and abetted.

doest the same things] The reference is doubtless to the passage from about Romans 1:26. External idolatry had vanished among the Jews since the captivity; but other forms of the subtle “worship of the creature” had taken its place; a gross immorality was far from rare; and sins of “strife, craft, and malignity,” were conspicuous.Romans 2:1. Διὸ, wherefore). Paul passes from the Gentiles to the Jews, as the whole of the following discourse clearly shows; and yet he does not use the transitive, but the illative particle, of which two the latter, as being the more powerful, absorbs the former. The Gentile does evil; the Jew does evil. Then in the 6th and following verses, he comprehends both, Jews and Gentiles.—ἀναπολόγητος, inexcusable.) Man seeks to defend himself.—ἄνθρωπε, O man) In ch. 1 he spoke of the Gentiles in the third person, but he deals with the Jew in the second person singular; even as the law itself deals with the Jew, not in the second, but in the third person singular; because it had no concern with any one but the Jew.—Comp. ch. Romans 3:19. But the apostle, who directs his discourse to Gentiles and Jews, addresses the Jew indeed in the second person singular, but calls him by the name [O man] common to all.—comp. ch. Romans 1:18; nor does he acknowledge the Jew, as such, Romans 2:17; Romans 2:28. The same difference between the third and second persons occurs again, Romans 2:14; Romans 2:17. It is a not dissimilar circumstance, that the Gentiles are put off [as to their condemnation] till the final judgment, Romans 2:16; but the Jews are threatened by the law with a present judgment also [besides the final one Romans 2:2.]—ὁ κρίνων, thou that judgest) being removed [i.e. wherein thou art distinguished] from those that have pleasure in evil-doers, Romans 1:32. Paul uses a weighty expression. The Jew esteems himself superior to the Greek, Romans 2:19, etc. Paul now calls that an act of judging, and by it opens up a way for himself, with a view to show the judgment of God. It is mere self-love in a man, that, in proportion as he thinks others worse than himself, he thinks the better of himself, Galatians 6:4. The figure paregmenon[21] occurs here; for κατακρίνεις follows.—Comp. ch. Romans 14:22-23; 1 Corinthians 4:3, etc., Romans 11:29, etc.; Jam 2:4.—ἓτερον, another) who is of no concern to thee; whose more open unrighteousness profits thee nothing; a heathen.

[21] A joining together of conjugate forms, or of simples and compounds, ex. gr. here, κρίνεις, κατακρίνεις.—ED.Verses 1-29. - (b) Those who judge others, not excepting the Jews. Here a new stage of the argument, in proof of the position propounded in Romans 1:18, begins, and is continued to the end of the chapter. The position to be proved is that all mankind is guilty before God (see note on ver. 18). So far this has been shown with regard to the mass of the heathen world; its general moral corruption, prevalent and condoned, having been pointed out finally as a glaring proof; the main point of the argument having been to trace this state of things to man's own fault, in that he had refused to retain and act on a knowledge of God originally imparted to him through nature and through conscience. From such refusal had ensued idolatry; thence, as a judicial consequence, profligacy; thence a general prevalence of abominable practices; and at last (in many at least) the "reprobate mind," lost to moral restraint, and approving of vice as well as practising it. Thus it is sufficiently proved that the heathen world, regarded as a whole, is under sin, and liable to the wrath of God. But the required proof that the whole of mankind is guilty is not yet complete. It might be said that there are many still who disapprove of all this wickedness, and sit in judgment on it, and who are, therefore, not themselves implicated in the guilt. To such persons the apostle now turns, his purpose being to show that their judging others does not exempt themselves, unless they can show that they are themselves sinless. All, he argues, are tainted with sin, and therefore implicated in the guilt of the human race, while the very fact of their judging others condemns them all the more. It is usually said by commentators that, the sin of the heathen world having been established in the first chapter, the second has reference exclusively to the Jews. But this is surely not so. The expressions, ἄνθρωπε and πᾶς ὁ κρίνων (vers. 1, 3), seem evidently to include all who judge others; and it is not till ver. 9 that any distinction between Jew and Gentile comes in. Nor would the argument have been complete without refutation of Gentile as well as Jewish judgers of others. For the philosophical schools especially claimed superiority to the mass of mankind, and would be likely to resent their own inclusion in the general condemnation. Notably the Stoics, whose philosophy was at that time, as well as that of the Epicureans, extensively professed by educated Romans. Seneca was a contemporary of St. Paul. The Stoics might be suitably designated as οἱ κρίνοντες: for they affected to look down from a position of calm philosophical superiority on those who followed their mere natural impulses, professing to be themselves guided by right reason, and superior to the passions of ordinary humanity. It was a home-thrust at them to ask - Are you, who thus judge others, as exempt as you profess to be from the vices you condemn? If the accounts that have come down to us of Seneca's own life be true, he certainly was not a paragon of virtue. Now, be it observed that the sort of people now addressed are not concluded to be sunk into all the depths of sin spoken of above; their very affecting to judge others implies, at any rate, theoretic approval of the right. Nor does St. Paul anywhere suggest that there is no difference between man and man with regard to moral worth before God; nay, in this very chapter he forcibly declares the moral excellence of some, without the Law as well as with the Law, and eternal life as its reward (vers. 7, 10, 14, 15). All he implies of necessity is that none whatever are so exempt from sin as to be in a position to judge others; and it is the judgment of others that he here especially attacks, as increasing, rather than exempting from, condemnation. For it involves in itself the sin of presumption, unless those that judge are sinless. But it may be said that the universal sinfulness of mankind is still not proved. For

(1) it is not actually demonstrated that all of those who judge "do the same things." The answer to this objection is, that this does not admit of rigid proof, and that therefore the apostle deems it enough to appeal to the consciences of the judgers themselves as to how the matter stands with them. But it may be said

(2) that the sinfulness of such persons as are spoken of in vers. 7, 10, 14, 15, 29-such, namely, as sincerely strive after good without setting themselves up as judges - is still unproved. So it is in this chapter; and, for logical completeness, the proof must be taken as implied. It was, we may suppose in the writer's mind, and afterwards, in ch. 7, where the inner consciousness of even the best is analyzed, the missing link of the argument is supplied. Verses 1, 2. - Therefore thou art inexcusable, O man, whosoever thou art that judgest: for wherein thou judgest another, thou condemnest thyself; for thou doest (rather, dost practise; the word is πράσσεις, see Romans 1:32) the same things. But we know that the judgment of God is according to truth against them which commit (or, practise, as before) such things. As has been observed above, the fact that πᾶς ὁ κρίνων "does the same things," is not proved; it is incapable of patent proof, and so the argument takes the form of an appeal to the consciences of such persons. "Porro quia ipsos interioris impuritatis insimulat, quae ut humanos oculos latet, redargui convincique nequeat humanis testimoniis, ad Dei judicium provocat, cui nec tenebrae ipsae sunt absconditae, et cujus sensu tangi peceatoribus, velint nolint, necesse est" (Calvin). On κατὰ ἀλήθειαν, in ver. 2, Calvin also remarks, "Veritas porro haec judicii in duobus consistit: quod sine personarum respectu delictum puniet, in quocunque deprehenderit homine; deinde quod externam speciem non moratur, nec opere ipso contentus est nisi a vera sinceri-tate animi prodeat." O man

General, but still with a general and slightly reproachful reference to the Jew.

Judgest (κρίνων)

With the sense of condemning.

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